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Preventing accounting fraud  
28 Feb 2019 
Technology can help identify possible fraud but it might not overcome ‘capture theory’ 
The early 21st century was a bad time for corporate America. Enron, WorldCom and Tyco 
International – among others – dominated headlines for accounting frauds that ran into billions of 
dollars. In the case of Enron it led to the demise of its auditors Arthur Andersen, whittling down the 
Big Five of accounting firms to a Big Four. The 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act was introduced to 
prevent similar future wrongdoing, along with the creation of the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) to protect the interests of investors. 
Even so, Lehman Brothers’ collapse in 2008 proved that “cooking the books” will always be a 
temptation for corporate bigwigs, especially when compensation is tied to a company’s earnings or 
stock price. What can be done to better protect shareholders and investors? 
“An important line of defence is fraud detection,” states Samuel Tan, Assistant Professor of 
Accounting at the SMU School of Accountancy. Accounting researchers use data analytics to 
identify likely cases of financial misconduct, and are constantly developing new techniques for 
fraud detection. 
For example, researchers have found that by looking at the Management Discussion and Analysis 
(MD&A) portion of a company’s annual report, it is possible to perform what is called “textual 
analysis” to detect possible irregularities. 
Textual analysis can also be applied to the spoken word. 
“Managers explain their financial results to shareholders in earnings calls,” Tan tells 
Perspectives@SMU, “and the papers explored the possibility of identifying misreporting by the 
firm based on linguistic analysis of the conference calls. That’s another way of applying textual 
analysis.” 
Regulating 
Tan elaborates that textual analysis is “writ[ing] programs to parse out text” to detect possible areas 
of concern – something that would be useful for auditors. It is also useful, Tan adds, for regulators. 
“What has been happening in financial accounting research worldwide is a shift towards more 
sophisticated tools to better understand the business world,” he says. “We need regulators that 
understand the tools that can be used to identify fraud, in order to correct it. 
“Training matters a lot. Training and tools can help people at the policymaking level and auditor 
level to find transactions where they should question management about anything dubious.” 
But even if the regulator is highly trained and applies the law down to the letter, human relations 
can get in the way of effective regulation. In his working paper “Individual Lawyers, the SEC 
Revolving Door, and Comment Letters”, Tan finds that hiring a lawyer who was formerly 
  
 
employed by a government regulator may help companies get more favourable outcomes from the 
regulator. 
Is that not just the smart thing to do? 
“It would be bad for investors if former government regulators are joining companies with the 
knowledge of how to find loopholes and allowing these companies to find the loopholes,” Tan 
posits, pointing out what is called the “capture theory of regulation”. 
He continues: “Another possible theory is what is known as the human capital theory, which is that 
companies hire regulators who are more aggressive at enforcing regulation. When these regulators 
leave the government, they may help companies better comply with the law. 
“My research has tended to agree with the argument that it hurts investors. Part of our findings 
suggest that a company that hires a lawyer who was employed by a regulator is less likely to make 
changes requested by the regulator. Specifically, a company is less likely to change its financial 
reports after receiving comments from a regulator, if it hires a lawyer who used to work for the 
regulator.” He notes: 
“In this dialogue between companies and regulators, the human element plays a big role. 
There’s an interesting example where the U.S. government was questioning a company 
regarding its accounting for a special purpose vehicle. There were multiple rounds of 
dialogue between the government and the firm, but the issue was resolved after a phone call 
with the regulator’s staff. The inquiry was dropped after the call, and it was agreed that all 
the company had to do was to reclassify several items in future filings.” 
“Companies,” he concludes, “can try to persuade staff at regulators, and if the company’s lawyer is 
talking to former colleagues at the regulators, the company may appear more convincing. The 
human element plays a big role.” 
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